FCC targets equipment testing and telecom licenses as federal agencies tighten tech supply chains and network security

Recent FCC actions

A. Equipment Authorization Order and NPRM

In response to emerging national security risks and supply chain vulnerabilities associated with certain foreign actors, the FCC adopted a Second Report and Order, Order on Reconsideration, and Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that would tighten oversight of the test laboratories, telecommunications certification bodies (“TCBs”), and laboratory accreditation bodies that make up the backbone of the FCC’s equipment authorization program.¹

Second Report and Order (“Order”). The FCC’s rules require manufacturers of electronic devices that emit radiofrequency (“RF”) energy to test the devices for compliance with the FCC’s technical standards in order to obtain the equipment authorizations required to import and market such devices in the United States. The Order is designed to incentivize testing in the United States and other trusted jurisdictions while enhancing transparency, oversight, and enforcement throughout the approval process. Key measures include:

1. Fast-Track Review for Equipment Tested in Trusted Test Labs. The Order establishes a fast-track priority review process under its current Pre-Approval Guidance framework for equipment tested in what it refers to as “Trusted Test Labs.” In effect, certain classes of devices would be subject to expedited approval if tested in laboratories located in the United States or in jurisdictions with which the United States has formal agreements (either a Mutual Recognition Agreement or a comparable trade deal to mutually accept product testing and certification results from other jurisdictions) (“Reciprocal Economies”).
2. Enhanced Disclosures Regarding Test Labs and TCB Employees. To better assess an entity’s trustworthiness, impartiality, and compliance with the Commission’s rules, test labs and TCBs must disclose the number and geographic location of employees engaged in FCC recognized testing and certification activities.
3. Stronger Enforcement. In addition to affirming that manufacturers, test labs, and TCBs may be held liable for false certifications, fraudulent test data, and related misconduct, the FCC clarifies that such violations—including those that implicate national security—may trigger sanctions, loss of recognition, and referral to enforcement authorities.
4. Post-Market Surveillance. The FCC directs its Office of Engineering and Technology (“OET”) to release a Public Notice setting forth updated procedures for monitoring the compliance status of equipment after it has entered the market, including how often samples are checked and making public certain significant instances of non-compliance.
5. Confidential Reporting Channels. OET is directed to establish confidential mechanisms for industry participants and other stakeholders to report suspected rule violations or national security threats related to the equipment authorization process.
6. Consolidated List of Prohibited Entities. To streamline compliance and screening, OET is directed to create and make available to TCBs a single consolidated list of “prohibited entities,” which includes the FCC’s Covered List, the Department of Commerce (“Commerce Department”) Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) Entity List, and other restricted-party lists maintained by the Departments of War, Homeland Security, and Treasury, among others.

Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“Test Labs NPRM”). While seeking to encourage domestic equipment testing, the Commission is simultaneously proposing new measures that would further restrict foreign access to its equipment authorization program.

In the accompanying Test Labs NPRM, the FCC proposes to prohibit recognition of test labs, TCBs, and laboratory accreditation bodies located in, or which conduct testing, certification, or accreditation in, countries that are not Reciprocal Economies. The FCC seeks comment on whether to withdraw recognition of entities that are already recognized and whether to extend the prohibition to entities directly or indirectly owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a non-Reciprocal Economy.

This builds on last year’s “Bad Labs” Order, which prohibited FCC recognition or participation in the equipment authorization program by test labs, TCBs, and laboratory accreditation bodies that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity.

B. Section 214 NPRM

In a separate Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the FCC proposes to strengthen oversight of domestic telecommunications services by limiting the ability of entities on the FCC’s Covered List from providing domestic interstate telecommunications services (“Section 214 NPRM”).

Pursuant to Section 214 of the Communications Act, prior FCC approval is required before a party may provide phone or data services that cross state lines (domestic 214 authority) or between the U.S. and foreign countries (international 214 authority).² Since 1999, the FCC has automatically granted domestic 214 authority to most U.S. carriers without first needing to apply for individual authorization.³ Under the new proposal, Covered List entities (including their affiliates and subsidiaries) would no longer be able to avail themselves of this “blanket” authority. Instead, the entity would need to file individual applications seeking affirmative approval for domestic 214 authority. The exclusion would extend to circumstances where such entities seek to obtain Section 214 authorizations through a transfer of control or an assignment of an existing authorization.

The FCC seeks comment on whether to adopt application requirements akin to those used for international Section 214 authorizations; whether to refer such applications to the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector—known as Team Telecom—for heightened national security review; and/or whether to prohibit interconnection agreements with excluded entities or adopt other measures to prevent such entities from accessing U.S. communications infrastructure through indirect or other unlicensed means.

Implications for device manufacturers

These actions present significant near-term implications for global testing and certification activities, particularly for manufacturers and other parties that rely on Chinese test labs, TCBs, and laboratory accreditation bodies.

The Order does not outright prohibit testing in China and other non-Reciprocal Economies, but it establishes a fast-track approval pathway that strongly incentivizes manufacturers to employ testing and certification facilities located in the United States and other trusted locations.

Further, the FCC adopts the rules proposed in the Test Labs NPRM to prohibit testing and certification activities in non-Reciprocal Economies, it would exclude large numbers of the testing and certification facilities that many manufacturers rely on today, forcing many manufacturers (located either in the United States or abroad) to pivot to new labs. This transition could increase costs and extend authorization timelines, particularly as manufacturers would be limited to a smaller pool of testing and certification facilities.

Implications for telecommunications carriers

The interconnection proposals in the NPRM would materially expand due‑diligence obligations for U.S. telecommunications providers, particularly around counterparty vetting, ongoing monitoring, and recordkeeping. The expansion is not styled as a due diligence rule, but the practical compliance effect is significant. Providers will need processes to affirmatively screen interconnection partners, not just rely on market practice or legacy peering arrangements. The proposal applies not only to named Covered List entities, but also current and future affiliates and subsidiaries, which effectively requires ownership and control diligence; ongoing monitoring for ownership or control changes; and reassessment of previously permissible interconnection arrangements.

The FCC’s broader national security toolbox

These proceedings are just the latest in the Commission’s efforts to mitigate supply chain risks and bolster the security of its equipment authorization regime. In addition to last year’s Bad Labs Order discussed above, other examples include:

• March 23, 2026: In response to several high-profile cyberattacks and government and private sector threat assessments, the FCC updated the Covered List to include all foreign-made routers.
• January 29, 2026: The FCC adopted a Report and Order establishing attestation and disclosure requirements for FCC licensees owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.
• December 22, 2025: The FCC updated the Covered List to include all uncrewed aircraft systems (“UAS” or “drone”) devices and UAS critical components produced outside the United States. At the same time, the FCC added communications and video surveillance equipment and services produced by Chinese tech companies DJI and Autel Robotics to the list.
• October 28, 2025: The FCC clarified that its prohibition on authorizing Covered List equipment applies to modular transmitters, i.e., self contained RF transmitter modules embedded in other devices. As a result, a device that includes a Covered List modular transmitter cannot be authorized, and thus cannot be marketed and sold in the United States.

In addition to these rule changes and Covered List updates, the FCC has aggressively investigated and revoked authority from entities posing national security risk, including dozens of China-based “bad labs” and Covered List entities holding Section 214 authorizations. There are no signs that the FCC’s heightened national security scrutiny is easing or that its enforcement actions are slowing down.

A whole-of-government approach

A. Interagency alignment

These recent actions also reflect a broader approach by the federal government to secure domestic telecommunications infrastructure and supply chains.

For example, the FCC updates the Covered List based on determinations from federal agencies with national security expertise.⁴ Recent determinations highlight the federal government’s scrutiny of risks posed by equipment capable of connecting to sensitive operational environments, including civilian and government networks and infrastructure.

There is also broad consensus across the federal government that insecure supply chains present opportunities for malevolent actors to develop capabilities for remote access and data collection. To further mitigate these risks, federal agencies have concluded that national security demands robust and viable domestic manufacturing and supply chains operated by trusted sources.

B. FCC and Commerce: Shared levers across communications and trade policy

The FCC’s expanding role in infrastructure and supply chain security also mirrors and, in some cases, overlaps with authorities exercised by other federal agencies, such as the Commerce Department’s Information and Communications Technology and Services (“ICTS”) regime, which is also tasked with addressing foreign adversaries in the U.S. technology supply chain. In fact, the ICTS Office is one of just a handful of federal agencies that Congress has explicitly authorized to issue Covered List determinations.

The Order also deepens ties with other parts of the Commerce Department by incorporating the BIS Entity List into its definition of “prohibited entities.” Like the Covered List, the BIS Entity List identifies parties deemed to be involved with activities that pose risks to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, and dealings with these parties are subject to heightened scrutiny. Further demonstrating the agencies’ shared national security interests, the Commerce Department is also tasked with advising Team Telecom in its FCC license and application reviews.

The direction is clear: the U.S. government remains concerned about foreign adversaries in the U.S. technology and telecom supply chain and is willing to use a variety of authorities to address those risks.

Our team is continuing to monitor developments. For questions about the FCC’s recent releases, or for guidance on assessing their impact on your business and planning next steps, please contact the authors.

Authored by Katy Milner, Elizabeth Cannon, Warren Kessler, Jaclyn Rosen, and Karalyn Hamill.