Insights and Analysis

Internet shutdowns – The human rights stakes of connectivity

01 April 2026

On 8 January 2026, Iranian authorities implemented a nationwide internet blackout that resulted in connectivity to the global internet declining by approximately 98% within 84 hours. This blackout did not occur in isolation, as in practice Iran had begun progressively restricting internet access since November 2019 in response to protests following the rise in fuel prices and then again in September 2022 after protests following the death of Mahsa Amini gained momentum. This time, it was in response to protests about the state of the economy, including rising fuel prices and inflation.

With SMS services, mobile data and cellular towers reportedly disconnected, it became increasingly difficult for Iranians to make and receive international calls and access information at a time of domestic uncertainty. On 4 March, the shutdown was enacted again, with the blackout still ongoing.

Iran is not the only country to implement internet shutdowns, with Access Now reporting that there were at least 296 shutdowns in 54 countries in 2024, especially during elections, exams and protests. Since early March, rolling internet blackouts have been reported in Russia, most notably in central Moscow and St Petersburg, with the government citing security concerns. In addition to the reasons governments give for enacting the shutdowns, they can have a substantial human rights impact.

The right to internet access

While the right to internet access is not a standalone treaty right, the internet undoubtedly functions as a gateway through which individuals exercise a wide range of existing rights. As societies become increasingly digitised, connectivity becomes essential to ensuring that citizens can participate meaningfully in modern life. It is for this reason that international bodies have increasingly affirmed these principles, with the UN Human Rights Council in Resolution 32/13 (2016) explicitly recognising that the “same rights that people have offline must also be protected online”.

By restricting access to digital communication platforms, the Iranian authorities have been seeking to silence dissenting voices, prevent the organisation of protests and stifle the free exchange of information. However, the consequences of internet shutdowns extend far beyond the suppression of speech and assembly, and in Iran we have seen a severe impact on a wide range of other human rights.

When access to information is curtailed, the right to education and the right to work are impacted greatly, with particularly large effects on those who rely on digital platforms for their businesses. The shutdown triggered a near-instant collapse of digital-dependent businesses, with some reported estimates citing direct daily losses of roughly US$119 million a day and far greater knock-on impacts across the broader economy.

Further, it was reported that with hospitals under surveillance and medical staff being arrested, citizens were left with limited options to access healthcare as telemedicine was forced offline. These practices undermine the right to health by obstructing safe, impartial access to medical care. All these rights are protected in international conventions (namely the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) that Iran has ratified.

The response of the ITU

In terms of who is responsible for ensuring that citizens globally have access to the internet and providing a framework for digital connectivity, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is a pretty strong contender. All UN member states (including Iran) are party to the ITU, which is the specialised UN agency for information and communication technologies.

Despite having the aim of “bringing digital connectivity to everyone”, the ITU Constitution gives States a degree of leeway when it comes to the shutting down of communication technology by allowing States to stop “the transmission of any private telegram which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to decency” and by permitting the “right to suspend the international telecommunication service, either generally or only for certain relations”. Both Articles come with caveats, in that the State must notify the office of origin of stoppage with regard to any communications, and the Secretary General of the ITU and other Member States when imposing a blanket shutdown.

It is not clear whether Iran has fulfilled its obligation to notify other States when making the decision to suspend its telecommunications service, but we do know that Iran has used these provisions as justifications for imposing their communications ban. As such, these Articles appear to be at odds with international human rights law standards, some of which are customary law.

In a 2021 report, the-then UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Clement N. Voule, called on the ITU to issue clarifying guidance on Articles 34 and 35 to ensure that they should never be used to authorise internet shutdowns. He also encouraged greater collaboration between States, internet service providers, mobile telephone operators and civil society groups in creating new policies in line with human rights principles.

Importantly, Iran knows how to use the ITU system to continue to justify the ongoing internet shutdown. Since the most recent internet shutdown, it has been reported that the Iranian Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Ali Bahreini, has written to Ms Bogdan-Martin asking for “immediate and concrete action” to cease the operation of Starlink satellite terminals that have been used by citizens to access the internet to circumvent the shutdown. The Iranian regime has imposed severe sanctions on those found to be in possession of such terminals.

Iran has previously complained to the ITU’s Radio Regulations Board (“RRB”) about the use of Starlink terminals in the country, with the latest decision having been made in November 2025, at the RRB’s 100th meeting. This process began in 2023, when Iran first made submissions about the unauthorised use of Starlink terminals in its territory and the Board began to gather evidence.

In November 2025, the Board requested that Iran continue its efforts to “identify and deactivate unauthorized Starlink terminals” within its territory and also urged Norway to use any means at its disposal to ensure that the Starlink operator immediately disable unauthorized transmissions in Iran.

In the Board’s findings in favour of Iran, there was no mention of why Starlink is being used in the country, or any discussion of the human rights impact for Iranian citizens. While the RRB is just referring to regulations that are within its remit, the lack of any reference to other international treaties and obligations that Iran is bound by has been criticized on the basis that this effectively legitimizes blanket internet shutdowns and sets a dangerous precedent.

Looking forward

In the absence of clear guidance to States on how Articles 34 and 35 of the ITU Constitution should be interpreted in line with international human rights law, there is the risk of States imposing internet shutdowns that go beyond what is necessary to genuinely protect national security interests. These shutdowns put the rights and even livelihoods of citizens at risk.