
Reflecting on President Trump’s first 100 days in office
The introduction of the U.S. outbound investment program (the “Program”), which came into effect on 2 January 2025, may add a new layer of complexity to secondary transactions involving U.S. investors.
Announced by the Biden administration and framed as a national security initiative, the Program aims to restrict or monitor certain outbound transactions engaged in by U.S. persons that involve persons affiliated with China, Hong Kong, or Macau with a nexus to the advanced semiconductors, quantum computing and AI sectors. President Trump has signalled that these sectors may be expanded to also include biotechnology, hypersonics, aerospace, advanced manufacturing, directed energy, and other sectors. While the Program is still undergoing refinement, market participants – particularly secondaries buyers, sellers and fund managers – must begin to assess the implications.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) issued a final rule implementing Executive Order 14105 on 28 October 2024 and this went into effect on 2 January 2025. The Program prohibits certain transactions made by U.S. persons and requires notification for other transactions.
The Program imposes prohibitions or notification requirements on U.S. persons in connection with covered transactions that would involve or create a covered foreign person.
U.S. person nexus
The Program applies to transactions entered into by a “U.S. person”, which includes:
The Program also prohibits U.S. persons from “knowingly directing” a transaction to be entered into by a non-U.S. person that would be prohibited if entered into by a U.S. person.
Finally, the Program requires that U.S. persons take “all reasonable steps” to prohibit and prevent their controlled foreign entities from engaging in a covered transaction that would be prohibited under the Program (if engaged in by a U.S. person) and to notify Treasury if their controlled foreign entities engage in a covered transaction that would be notifiable under the Program (if engaged in by a U.S. person).
Covered transactions
The Program applies to certain transactions, including a U.S. person’s direct or indirect:
Covered foreign persons
Covered foreign persons are persons of a country of concern (defined as China, Macau or Hong Kong) engaged in a “covered activity” and other persons with significant financial ties to such persons. Persons of a country of concern include:
In turn, covered foreign persons include:
Covered activities
The industries targeted by the Program are: (i) semiconductors and microelectronics; (ii) quantum information technologies; and (iii) certain artificial intelligence systems. U.S. persons’ covered transactions involving covered foreign persons engaged in certain specified activities within each of these industries are prohibited, and such transactions involving covered foreign persons engaged in a subset of activities in the semiconductors and microelectronics and artificial intelligence sectors are notifiable. As noted above, President Trump has signalled that these sectors may be expanded to also include biotechnology, hypersonics, aerospace, advanced manufacturing, directed energy, and other sectors.2
Although the Program only applies in situations where the U.S. person has “knowledge” of facts or circumstances that would mean the rules apply, “knowledge” under the Program includes actual knowledge, awareness of a high probability, or reason to know of a fact or circumstance.
Further, if Treasury assesses that an investor did not conduct a "reasonable and diligent inquiry,” the investor will be treated as if he or she had knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances. The Program provides a list of factors (e.g., diligence, representations) against which Treasury will judge whether a U.S. person investor has engaged in a reasonable and diligent inquiry.
There are certain U.S. person transactions that effectively are carved out of the scope of the Program. For the purposes of this article, the relevant exceptions are satisfied if:
*With respect to 1.3(a), 1.3(b), and 1.3(c), the exception does not apply if the transaction affords the investor rights beyond standard minority shareholder protections (e.g., the power to prevent the sale or pledge of all or substantially all of the assets of an entity) with respect to the relevant covered foreign person.
With respect to 1.3(a), we would note that there is no clear guidance on what ‘committed capital’ should capture in the context of the acquisition of an LP interest.
An LP secondary transaction may not, on its face, appear to involve foreign technology investments. However, buyers who qualify as U.S. persons acquiring LP interests in funds with underlying exposures to covered foreign persons may fall within the scope of the Program, even if only indirectly, and could inadvertently enter into a prohibited or notifiable transaction. Furthermore, buyers may encounter issues under the Program through their go-forward exposure to activities by the target funds – for example, through new portfolio investments or changes of strategy within existing portfolio companies.
Due to the Program’s knowledge standard, which requires investors to make a reasonable and diligent inquiry, buyers may now need to dig deeper into the portfolio companies of target funds - in particular, where fund documentation is silent on geographic or sectoral allocations. Buyers will likely need to perform enhanced “look-through” diligence on the portfolio companies of the relevant fund to identify any exposure to covered foreign persons. As described above, such covered foreign persons could include entities organised outside of China, Macau, or Hong Kong, and even could include portfolio companies that are organised in the United States (or anywhere else in the world). Such scenarios could occur if the portfolio company has sufficient financial ties to entities that are themselves covered foreign persons (e.g., a UK holding company that derives more than 50 percent of its revenue from a Chinese quantum computing company). A covered foreign person also could include a U.S. entity engaged in covered activities if it is majority owned or controlled by a person of a country of concern (e.g., a Chinese citizen living in the United States if such person is not a U.S. citizen or a U.S. permanent resident). These scenarios emphasise why conducting a “reasonable and diligent inquiry” is critical.
In the market, some buyers are seeking to satisfy the requirement for an excepted transaction by building in binding contractual assurances in the transaction documents. During its negotiations of the transfer agreement, a buyer may ask for a direct warranty from the general partner (“GP”) that none of the target fund’s portfolio companies is engaged in any covered activities or that none of the fund’s prior investments constituted “covered transactions.” The buyer also may ask for a separate covenant that none of the outstanding capital commitments inherited by the buyer would be used to engage in a “covered transaction,” that the fund not engage in any future investment that would constitute a covered transaction, or that the buyer be excused from any future investment that would constitute a covered transaction.
Where certain interests may be at risk of triggering the Program, a buyer may seek to insert language in the purchase and sale agreement that would allow an interest to drop out of the sale portfolio if it would be prohibited or require notification under the Program.
Looking at this more widely, transaction documents may need to evolve to allocate responsibility for filings and information gathering post-closing where an interest requires notification under the Program.
Buyers should raise appropriately framed questions with GPs as part of their diligence process to ascertain any potential regulatory triggers, alongside reviewing fund documentation, financial reports and past capital call notices to identify any potential exposure to covered sectors or geographies. In order to satisfy the knowledge requirement (including the “reasonable and diligent inquiry” standard), buyers may also look to conduct desktop investigations into publicly available sources of information as part of their diligence process.
As mentioned above, secondaries buyers may increasingly require GPs to provide representations or warranties concerning the fund’s exposure to countries and sectors covered by the Program. In addition, GPs may be asked to confirm (either in transaction documents or in due diligence) whether they anticipate making any investments that could trigger notification or prohibition under the Program (in the case of non-U.S. funds), if engaged in by a U.S. person. This could create tension between GPs’ investment flexibility and the compliance obligations of their U.S. investors, especially if the GP does not view the Program as applying directly to its strategy, and this could create difficulties for the overall transaction if the GP is unwilling to engage on this topic. GPs of funds that are themselves U.S. persons may argue that they have an ongoing obligation to comply with the Program, which will often be sufficient comfort for U.S. investors. However, for target funds that are not U.S. persons and therefore may not have ongoing compliance obligations themselves, additional comfort regarding go-forward compliance and/or investor excuse rights may be sought from the GP.
Where the buyer will be obtaining rights to participate in the target fund’s investment committee and/or portfolio company board, additional attention should be paid to ensure that such participation does not trigger issues under the Program. Such participation may result in the buyer (or a U.S. person executive within the buyer) having ”knowingly directed” a covered transaction, unless the buyer satisfied the specific recusal requirements described in the Program. This is particularly a concern where the target fund is not a U.S. person and, therefore, may not otherwise have compliance obligations under the Program. Further, the buyer obtaining more than standard minority shareholder protections (e.g., a portfolio company board position) could negate the applicability of the potential exceptions described above.
The Program signals a new era of scrutiny on U.S. capital flows abroad, with implications that extend well beyond their national security origins. For secondaries market participants, the reach of this policy is being felt by U.S. buyers and it is important that transferring parties are alive to these regulations and the issues they may cause. By developing proactive diligence, risk management, and contractual frameworks, investors can continue to transact with confidence in an increasingly complex regulatory environment.
At Hogan Lovells, our secondaries and national securities teams are closely monitoring regulatory developments and advising clients on structuring transactions to manage emerging risks. Whether you’re a seller seeking liquidity, a buyer deploying capital, or a GP navigating both sides of a deal, it is vital to understand and know how to work within this evolving landscape.
Authored by Leanne Moezi, Michael Rogers, Lily Wu, Brian Curran, and Zach Alvarez.
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