
Life Sciences Law Update
A trio of federal court decisions has emboldened the plaintiffs' bar with a new potential tool to wield in the ongoing wave of litigation targeting businesses for their use of routine website technologies: the California Consumer Privacy Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 et seq. (“CCPA”). See M.G. v. Therapymatch, Inc., 2024 WL 4219992 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2024); In re BetterHelp, Inc. Data Disclosures Cases (“In re BetterHelp”), 2024 WL 3416511 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2024); Shah v. Capital One Financial Corp., 2025 WL 714252 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). In each case, the court adopted an expansive reading of the CCPA's private right of action, allowing claims to survive dismissal based on allegations that a business disclosed personal information to third-party technology providers without consumer consent.
As plaintiffs continue to test novel theories in privacy litigation, this line of cases threatens to expand the CCPA’s limited private right of action far beyond its widely understood scope: data breach litigation.
In recent years, organizations across industries have faced a wave of putative class actions challenging their use of third-party cookies, pixels, web beacons, and similar online tools to support everyday business functions — such as analyzing web traffic, monitoring site performance, and personalizing advertisements. Plaintiffs’ claims vary based on the defendant’s industry sector, the specific technologies used, and the types of data those technologies are configured to collect and share. But broadly speaking, these claims often rest on a common theory of liability: that website operators use these technologies to send information about users’ online interactions (e.g., IP addresses, pages viewed, form submissions) to third parties without consent, and that those third parties purportedly exploit this information for profiling, targeted advertising, or other commercial purposes.
These lawsuits typically assert a range of claims, from conventional common law causes of action — such as negligence or invasion of privacy — to statutory claims, including those that carry significant per-violation statutory damages. For instance, Plaintiffs frequently invoke decades-old state and federal wiretapping laws — such as the federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2520(c) (up to US $10,000 per violation), and the California Invasion of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code § 637.2(a) (up to US $5,000 per violation) — and have also invoked more obscure statutes, such as Arizona’s Telephone, Utility and Communication Service Records Act, A.R.S. § 44-1376.04 (up to US $1,000 per violation).
Some of these claims, however, have begun to falter as cases proceed through discovery and class certification. See Torres v. Prudential Financial, Inc., 2025 WL 1135088 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17 2025). At the same time, California lawmakers are considering Senate Bill 690, which would amend CIPA to expressly exempt the processing of personal information for a “commercial business purpose” consistent with the CCPA. If enacted, S.B. 690 would significantly limit plaintiffs ability to prevail on CIPA claims targeting routine website practices. Against this backdrop, it is unsurprising that the plaintiffs’ bar has set its eyes on other claims, such as the CCPA, that could offer another path forward.
The CCPA is a comprehensive state privacy law that grants California residents broad privacy rights and imposes related obligations on covered businesses. When first proposed as a ballot measure in 2018, the CCPA would have created a broad private right of action, permitting California consumers to bring civil actions for any violation of the Act. The ballot measure also specified that any violation of the CCPA would “constitute an injury in fact.” To avoid the uncertainty of a ballot vote, California’s legislature introduced AB-375, which narrowed certain aspects of the proposal in exchange for withdrawal of the ballot initiative. AB-375 intentionally removed the “injury in fact” language and limited the private right of action to a single section: “Personal Information Security Breaches.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150(a).
As enacted, the CCPA’s private right of action is limited to “consumer[s] whose nonencrypted and nonredacted personal information [as defined under Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5(A)(1)(d)] … is subject to an unauthorized access and exfiltration, theft, or disclosure as a result of the business’ violation of the duty to implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices[.]” Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.150(a) (emphasis added).1
While the CCPA broadly defines “personal information” to include any information that is linked or reasonably linkable to a consumer or household, the private right of action relies on a much narrower definition under the California Consumer Records Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5(A)(1)(d). For purposes of the private right of action, “personal information” is limited to:
See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.81.5(A)(1)(d).
The legislature elected to vest the California Attorney General, and later the California Consumer Privacy Protection Agency (“CPPA”)2, with exclusive authority to enforce all other provisions of the CCPA.
In August 22, 2018, shortly after the enactment of AB-375, then California Attorney General "Xaiver" Becerra wrote a letter to the legislature, asking it to expand the private right of action to cover a broader array of CCPA’s obligations, noting that as currently enacted, “the Act includes a provision that gives consumers a limited right to sue if they become a victim of a data breach.”3 Yet, the legislature declined to do so. This legislative history supports what was, until recently, the common understanding that the CCPA’s private right of action was circumscribed to alleged data breaches.
At least three courts have accepted the plaintiffs’ bar different formulation of the CCPA private right of action, pushing it beyond its widely understood scope. For instance, in M.G. v. Therapymatch, Inc., the plaintiff asserted, a CCPA claim against the defendant for its alleged use of an analytics tool on its online platform, which purportedly caused plaintiff’s web browser to transmit plaintiff’s browsing information to the third-party technology provider. 2024 WL 4219992, at *1. Although the defendant argued that “courts only recognize private rights of action under the CCPA in the data breach context,” the district court disagreed solely because courts “have let CCPA claims survive a motion to dismiss where a plaintiff alleges that defendants disclosed plaintiff’s personal information without his consent due to the business’s failure to maintain reasonable security practices.” Id. at *7.4
Other courts have treated the issue with similarly short shrift. The court permitted a CCPA claim to proceed in In re BetterHelp, Inc. after finding that plaintiff’s information was disclosed “because BetterHelp affirmatively allowed the tracking software on its websites—which can reasonably be argued was not an appropriate security procedure or practice, given the nature of the information.” 2024 WL 3416511, at *5 . The Shaw court reached the same outcome “[b]ecause Plaintiffs plead that Defendant disclosed their personal information without their consent.” 2025 WL 714252, at *8.
Even so, there are at least four reasons to think other courts may disagree with this interpretation.
While there are strong arguments against plaintiffs’ expansive interpretation of the CCPA’s private right of action, businesses are well-advised to proactively mitigate the risk of website privacy claims more generally. Key actions include:
Authored by Adam Cooke, Vassi Iliadis, Jay Ettinger, Aidan Coleman, and Alaa Salaheldin.
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