Insights and Analysis

When sanctions collide with jurisdiction — A new era for service on individuals outside the UK

13 May 2026

The Court of Appeal decision in Fridman v Agrofirma and another (“Fridman”) sets a new approach by the English courts to service on individuals. For businesses, financial institutions and litigation teams, the judgment in Fridman requires reconsideration of long-standing assumptions on service and applicability of the CPR. The judgment creates a new category of defendant, whose actual or deemed presence within the jurisdiction might no longer fall within the scope of the CPR for the purposes of service of proceedings.

Chapter 1 Background/High Court decision

In 2016, Mr Mikhail Fridman acquired Athlone House in London, which became his usual residence. After being designated on 15 March 2022 under regulations 5 and 6 of the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 and Part 1 of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, Mr Fridman was required to leave the UK and was prohibited from returning.

The Claimants sent a letter before action to Mr Fridman on 16 August 2023 (which was not responded to), at a point in time where Mr Fridman was still resident in the UK; he did not leave the UK until 27 September 2023. The Claimants then served proceedings addressed to Mr Fridman at Athlone House on 20 March 2024, relying on CPR 6.9, which allows for service of a document at an individual's “usual or last known residence”. The Claimants attempted to serve proceedings on a further three occasions on 28 March 2024, 6 June 2024 and 7 June 2024, at both Athlone House and at three possible alternative addresses, including at the address of Mr Fridman's solicitors.

Mr Fridman challenged that the proceedings had been served on him on the basis that Mr Fridman was not within the jurisdiction at the time of the first attempted service.

The High Court found in favour of the Claimants, on the basis that Athlone House was Mr Fridman's ‘usual residence' under CPR 6.9 when proceedings were served at that address in March 2024 and even if that were not the case, Athlone House was his ‘last known' address. The High Court held that, the proceedings had been validly served on Mr Fridman.

Chapter 2 The Court of Appeal decision

Mr Fridman appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal reversed the High Court's decision, on the basis that physical presence (including the legal ability to be present) remains a fundamental requirement of personal service and this requirement cannot be satisfied in circumstances where the state itself has rendered an individual's presence impossible. In other words, if an individual is barred from entering the UK, the English courts cannot treat such an individual as ‘present' for jurisdictional purposes, regardless of whether there was compliance with the CPR when service was effected.

In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeal considered a number of authorities including Kamali v City & Country Properties [2006] (which pointed towards a literal interpretation of the word ‘presence') and SSL v TTK [2011], where it was held that that temporary absence will not negate presence within the jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal noted that case law on this subject has largely operated on the assumption that temporary absences are voluntary/self-imposed and therefore do not act to remove a person from the jurisdiction.

In the case of Mr Fridman, it was the state itself which had denied him the requisite ‘presence' to be served in England and Wales. Consequently, the Court of Appeal found it “legally irrelevant” whether Mr Fridman might be considered resident in England or not, on the basis that his enforced and indefinite removal from the UK meant that at the time of service (and indeed at the time of the Court of Appeal's judgment) “in no ordinary sense of the words could Mr Fridman be said to have been present (or resident) at Athlone House after 27 September 2023”. As the first attempt at service to commence proceedings was on 20 March 2024, at which point the sanctioned Mr Fridman had physically left UK soil and was not permitted to enter back in to the UK, the 20 March attempt was held not to be valid service (along with the subsequent attempts).

Chapter 3 Impact on CPR 6.9

For years, litigators have relied on CPR 6.9 for a variety of practical purposes, including for the purposes of serving individuals who maintain UK property but spend long periods abroad. Fridman draws a new boundary, which can be viewed broadly as follows:

Temporary absence (for holidays, business travel, periods of time abroad) → Still compatible with CPR 6.9 for the purposes of service within the jurisdiction.
Compulsory absence (as a result of sanctions, deportation, exclusion orders) → Serves to sever the link with the jurisdiction for the purposes of service within the jurisdiction pursuant to CPR 6.9.

The Court of Appeal further clarified that a defendant's intention to return to the jurisdiction is irrelevant in circumstances where such a return is impossible. A defendant cannot be “present” in a jurisdiction that he/she is prohibited from entering. This establishes an additional operational rule: if a defendant is prohibited from entering the UK, the claimant must seek permission to serve the defendant outside the jurisdiction on the basis of one (or more) of the jurisdictional gateways in Practice Direction 6B.

Chapter 4 Practical tips

The judgment in Fridman introduces new and ever greater complexities for effecting service on a defendant subject to sanctions, and/or where the defendant is prevented from entering the jurisdiction.

For defendants in these circumstances, it creates a new line of challenge to an order granting permission to serve out of the jurisdiction.

When engaged in a dispute with an individual who is sanctioned and/or subject to mandatory travel restrictions, it is important to be aware that English courts will likely require a claimant to apply for permission to serve that individual out of the jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of Practice Direction 6B. This introduces the potential for additional complexity, time, cost and, in some cases, the possibility of refusal of permission or additional practical difficulties and complications in certain high-risk jurisdictions.

When dealing with individuals and entities at risk of sanctions, it is now even more important to consider building in protections into key contracts. This is to seek to ensure that, if a dispute arises, there can be no debate as to whether service of proceedings has been validly effected. In particular, parties should consider providing for agents for service of process and/or irrevocable service addresses within the jurisdiction, in each case with an obligation to update the service, failing which service at that address will be deemed valid.

Authored by Ivan Shiu, Jourdan Penrice, and Shah Warraich.