
Reflecting on President Trump’s first 100 days in office
On May 23, 2025, President Trump signed four Executive Orders intended to expedite the development and deployment of American nuclear technology.
The orders would affect the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”), the Department of Energy (“DOE”), and the Department of Defense (“DoD”) and their respective roles in nuclear energy.1 The Administration characterized these actions as the most consequential reforms to nuclear regulation in decades, marking the beginning of a new era in American nuclear energy innovation and development that builds on the ADVANCE Act of 2024. These orders focus on (1) modernizing the NRC’s culture and regulatory processes, (2) speeding deployment of nuclear reactors at DOE and DoD sites to power artificial intelligence (“AI”)-focused installations, (3) expediting reactor testing under DOE jurisdiction, and (4) rebuilding the nuclear fuel supply chain using the Defense Production Act (“DPA”).
Each of these Executive Orders is summarized below, accompanied by initial insights from our team. Together these actions show that the Administration is making nuclear energy a national priority, with the ultimate goal of quadrupling nuclear generation in the United States by 2050 to meet growing power needs of the country and in particular AI data centers. To achieve this end, the Administration proposes through these Executive Orders an expansive use of DOE and DoD authorities to increase prototyping of new reactor designs and technologies. The actions also show that the Administration wants U.S. nuclear technology to be competitive in global markets for new nuclear, in part to counter Russia and China.
The Executive Orders direct agencies within the Executive Branch to undertake specific actions, and also set forth Administration policy with respect to nuclear technology, both of which fall within the purview of the Executive Branch. But the devil, as always, is lurking in the details. By themselves, these Executive Orders are limited in legal effect; many of the changes directed would require the appropriation of additional funds by Congress, and others may require statutory changes to move forward.
The Executive Orders are therefore best read as at least partially aspirational, in that their directives as to the Executive Branch are dependent on the cooperation of the Legislative Branch and the willingness of legislators to make corresponding legal and budgetary changes. In addition, there will be legal hurdles to clear. There are existing regulations that must be modified or replaced in accordance with the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Legal challenges can be expected, as nuclear technology remains controversial in some circles despite strong bipartisan support. The specifics of any implementation are also likely to meet NIMBY resistance. The Supreme Court’s recent decision circumscribing the scope of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)2 should reduce the risks and burden of litigation, but it remains to be seen to what extent.
The Hogan Lovells Team, which includes specialists in nuclear regulation, electricity regulation, DOE contracts and funding, and energy transactions, looks forward to assisting clients in understanding the Executive Orders and crafting strategies to navigate the impact of these changes and capitalize on the benefits.
This Executive Order (Ordering the Reform of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission – The White House) seeks to promote the following policies within the United States:
The order seeks to reform the culture of the NRC so that in carrying out its licensing and regulatory function, the NRC considers the benefit of nuclear power to economic and national security, in addition to protecting public health and safety. The Administration shares the view that overregulation by the NRC has stifled nuclear power – with only two new reactors ordered and brought on line since 1978.
The order directs the NRC to undergo the following restructuring:
The NRC shall work with DOGE and the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) to review and revise all of its regulations and guidance documents, issuing proposed rules in 9 months and final rules in 18 months. NRC rules and guidance shall be revised in the following ways:
Insights: A significant complication for the NRC will be the requirements of the APA. Fortunately, the NRC has a head start on meeting these requirements, as many of the directives resemble the changes mandated by the ADVANCE (Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy) Act, which was passed in 2024 by large bipartisan margins.
As beneficial as a regulatory head start is likely to be, legal challenges over some changes are likely inevitable and could be lengthy. For example, the requirement to adopt “science-based” radiation limits is likely to trigger lawsuits by parties that disagree with the NRC’s conclusions. The existing linear no-threshold model (which deems any amount of radiation potentially harmful) is deeply ingrained in public consciousness. Developing a new limit that considers radiation below a certain threshold of little concern, regardless of its scientific merit, is likely to trigger public opposition and litigation. Industry participants should be prepared to provide technical data and legal support for proposed changes.
There is also a necessary tension in seeking to relieve regulatory burdens while also maintaining the United States’ leading safety record. The nuclear industry has suffered greatly in the wake of prior reactor accidents, even those taking place overseas under extreme conditions not likely to occur in the United States, or that resulted in no significant release of radiation or injuries. The growing public trust in the technology could be shattered simply by the impression that safety may be compromised, something of which the NRC is well aware. The NRC can be expected to “keep its eye on the ball” of operational safety, even as it adopts sweeping reforms. Industry participants can point to the stellar safety record of existing plants and the inherent safety features (e.g., passive shutdown systems) of new reactor designs and new fuels that limit offsite dose consequences.
Fixed deadlines in the licensing process will be a challenge for both the NRC and applicants. Prospective applicants should develop a licensing engagement strategy to take advantage of the pre-application process with the NRC staff, which can help resolve any issues in advance of filing and ensure that the application provides the NRC with all information it needs. After filing, applicants must be prepared to be agile and respond promptly to NRC requests for additional information (“RAI”) or any technical or environmental issues that arise during the review process.
This Executive Order (Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security – The White House) seeks to promote the following policies within the United States:
This order seeks to enable the deployment of advanced nuclear reactor technologies at military installations by directing the Secretary of Defense to:
This order further seeks to promote the development of advanced nuclear reactor technologies at DOE facilities through co-locating nuclear reactors with AI data centers and prioritizing opening an advanced nuclear reactor at a DOE site within three years.
The order promotes the domestic supply of uranium and nuclear fuel through the following initiatives:
The Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy shall consult with the CEQ to apply categorical exclusions under NEPA for the construction of advanced nuclear reactor technologies on certain Federal sites.
This order aims to promote American nuclear exports and enhance the global competitiveness of U.S. nuclear firms.
Insights: The Administration is seeking to leverage the deployment of micro-reactors at defense installations as a catalyst for private-sector development. Constructing a first-of-its-kind reactor on a domestic military base and putting it into operation in 2028 is an ambitious goal, and one that will be highly dependent on Congress choosing to appropriate the needed funds, something that is not likely to happen until at least 2026. The selection of a site and a contractor will then need to proceed with alacrity uncharacteristic of DoD projects.
Although it is unsaid in the order, it seems likely that the Administration intends for the rapid deployment to be done under DOE’s authority rather than under that of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This means that DOE would have to authorize DoD to operate a nuclear reactor under what is known as 91b authority as it did with Project PELE; and to authorize reactors at DOE sites under DOE’s broad authority under the Atomic Energy Act. However, this poses an interesting liability problem for the reactor development community. Reactors authorized by DOE do not participate in the NRC’s public liability insurance program under the Price Anderson Amendments Act (PAAA). DOE extends indemnification through its contracts to contractors conducting DOE work that involve a risk of public liability. DoD does not have statutory authority to extend this indemnification. It seems likely that DOE would need to exercise significant control of reactors located on its sites in order to flow PAAA coverage to the effort likely through the use of Other Transaction Agreements with DOE startup and oversight included in the agreement. Developers at DoD sites would likely want the Secretary of Defense to authorize Public Law 85-804 coverage to indemnify them for “unusually hazardous or nuclear risks.” It could be that DOE and DoD jointly solicit these deployments in a way that leverages both the statutory authorities to help the development community attenuate its risk though that level of specificity is not in the EO. Attention to how liability risk is apportioned under this framework is of critical importance to the developer community.
Although the privately-funded projects are not contingent on Congressional cooperation, the designation of appropriate sites will take time. This is not merely a matter of identifying and permitting the sites. Litigation from neighboring communities is likely, and depending on the intended electrical configuration of the chosen sites, there may be significant challenges integrating the new reactors into the power grid within the desired timeframe. Further, locating on DOE and DoD sites in arid western states may depend on the ability of the government to make the federal reserved water rights available to developers.
On-site electrical generation, whether nuclear or otherwise, is usually connected to the electric grid, which provides back-up power for the site in case of an outage and blackstart capacity for the generator itself. In many cases, such connections also permit the export of power, providing an additional revenue stream by allowing excess power to be sold. However, the electric grid in the United States is aging and overburdened, and the queues to interconnect either new generators or large load (customers) are badly backlogged. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has been diligently working to reform interconnection processes and encourage the construction of new transmission infrastructure to expand the grid, but these efforts face numerous roadblocks, not the least of which is that it is the states, not FERC, that have the primary responsibility for siting new transmission lines. Because of these issues, sites will have to be chosen with an eye to whether the local electric grid has the capacity available for the reactor or can be swiftly upgraded to accommodate it.3
This Executive Order (Reforming Nuclear Reactor Testing at the Department of Energy – The White House) directs DOE to reform its processes for testing advance nuclear reactors. In order to expedite U.S. development of advanced nuclear technologies, the DOE must modernize the framework for testing and constructing new reactor designs (i.e., micro-reactors, SMRs, and Generation IV technologies). The U.S. has fewer test reactors today than it did in the 1970s and 1980s when the current fleet was being developed. The testing addressed by this EO is solely for research purposes, not commercial electricity generating, which puts it within DOE’s jurisdiction, rather than that of the NRC. To achieve these goals, DOE shall:
Insights: This approach, harnessing the DOE to take an active role in testing new technologies, has the potential to greatly speed up the process of licensing a new technology. But, as with the other Executive Orders, it faces time and money challenges. Money would need to be appropriated by Congress to support this testing program, though that might be mitigated somewhat by charging fees to the developer (which are paid to the U.S. Treasury). The revision of the environmental standards would have to be implemented in accordance with the APA, and, as with the other changes, will be likely to spawn legal challenges.
This EO also stakes out a new line between prototyping and demonstration for the purposes of DOE regulatory authority. DOE has authority to independently regulate reactors operated under contract with it, without an NRC license, so long as those reactors are not operated as part of the power generation facilities of an electric utility or operated to “demonstrate the suitability of commercial” viability of the design. The Administration here made clear that advanced reactor technology remains at the level of proving “technological viability” and is not near commercial demonstration. As such, the Executive Order’s instruction for DOE to enter into contracts to develop three off-DOE site test reactors, that it will then regulate, shows a recognition that the industry needs to test its systems under nuclear operating conditions without first going through the NRC licensing process. It also shows a willingness to have the federal government stand in as the insurer of record for these prototypes by making them projects “under contract with and for the account of” the Department for which Price Anderson indemnification would apply.4
This Executive Order (Reinvigorating the Nuclear Industrial Base – The White House) seeks to expedite and promote the production of nuclear energy and advanced nuclear reactor technologies, and build supply chains to protect energy independence and national security.
This order directs the strengthening of the domestic nuclear fuel cycle – including spent nuclear fuel storage and disposal -- by requiring the Secretary of Energy to:
This order provides funding for the restart, completion, or construction of nuclear plants.
Insight: As with the other Executive Orders, the challenges here are funding and the short time frame allotted. Although many of the directed changes appear feasible and could greatly increase the efficiency of the nuclear industry in the United States, there is likely to be a delay at the outset. The need for legislation, especially appropriations in what is otherwise a belt-tightening time for the Administration, the time required for regulatory and legislative decision-making, and the delays caused by litigation are likely to drag out the timeline beyond the dates set in the Executive Order.
The desire to meet those deadlines can also open up another pitfall. Shortcuts made with the intention of hastening the regulatory process are more likely to result in litigation, and increase the chances of that litigation being successful, particularly if the primary goal is to cause delay.
The EO reflects the reality that the goal of 5 GW of increased domestic nuclear capacity over the next five years is likely to be realized through power uprates and restart of shutdown units rather than through the construction of new reactors. DOE’s willingness to use the DOE Loan Programs Office to support such efforts is a positive sign. The EO also shows that the Administration expects large-scale reactors to be part of the mix along with SMRs. The Administration and industry understand that cost and schedule overruns have been a serious problem for construction of large reactors, and so this will be an area of focus going forward for all stakeholders.
Authored by Dan Stenger, Amy Roma, Mary Anne Sullivan, Porter Wiseman, Stewart Forbes, and Valerie Marshall.
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